The president in India's parliamentary system is authorized to promulgate legislation under Article 123.
no distinction in principle between a law made by the legislature (i.e. an Act of Parliament) and an ordinance issued by the President."
17 They are products of legislative power and are subject to similar constitutional limitations. Therefore, the reviewability of presidential satisfaction in Article 123 depends on the principles of judicial review applicable in the context of legislative power. And that explains why a syllogistic reference to Article 356 is a false start, though as we shall see later, the jurisprudence of that provision is not entirely irrelevant to the question at hand.
Text & Motive: Two Challenges to Overcome
Because the reviewability of presidential satisfaction in Article 123 depends on the principles of judicial review ordinarily applicable to legislative power, a number of challenges lie ahead. To appreciate them, consider the following set of hypothetical facts. A sudden economic recession has put three of India's leading financial institutions at risk. There is a prospect of bankruptcy, which if it materialises would have a cascading effect on the economy, adding to unemployment and financial losses to millions. Parliament is not in session. The president promulgates The Bank Nationalization Ordinance, 2011 (BNO) with the objective of nationalizing banks at risk to save them from potential bankruptcy. To assume that presidential satisfaction in Article 123 is subject to judicial review would imply that courts may invalidate the BNO on the ground that the president wrongly came to the satisfaction that it was necessary. In other words, the law is unconstitutional because it is unnecessary. That conclusion would be novel, but also analytically challenging for two reasons.
First, Article 245 defines parliament's legislative power: "Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws ..." Relying on this provision, the Supreme Court in Gandhi v. Narain, 18 explained that a law is valid provided Parliament has subjectmatter competence to enact it, and does so without violating provisions of the Constitution. Government had taken over the functioning of a partially publicly funded "non-official, nonpolitical and non-profit organization" through an Act. 26 When challenged on the ground that it was principally motivated by political malice towards the patrons of the Council, the Court rejected the plea. 27 "If the legislature is competent to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant," Justice Lahoti said. 28 On the other hand, "if the legislature lacks competency, the question of motive does not arise at all."
India's position on legislative motive is a straightforward adaptation of English law.
In Edinburgh v. Wauchope, 29 Lord Campbell objected to the idea that courts may enquire into the proceedings of an Act. "All that a Court of Justice can do," he said, "is to look to the deliberations as a guide to Congress's impermissible motivations. Equally, courts were inclined to return to the earlier standard of proof that was willing to grant the legislature widest possible benefit of doubt in matters of motives. Depending on the motives alleged, and the kind of evidence adduced to substantiate that, the argument might receive a sympathetic hearing in the second and fourth period. But the success of motive arguments is hard to predict; there is thus far no case where a statute has been successfully challenged solely on grounds of impermissible motives.
To summarize then, legislative power in India is subject to two conditions onlyparliamentary motives not being one of them. And because the Supreme Court has tied Acts and ordinances to the same string of legislative power, expanding judicial review in one case (say ordinances) leads to an expansion in the other (Acts Because both presidential and parliamentary legislative powers are conditional, it would be misleading to emphasise "conditionality" as the distinguishing feature of the former. Therefore, recasting president's legislative powers as circumstantially conditional may be a more apt description. That is to say, while Article 123 specifies the particular circumstances in which president's legislative power may be invoked, Article 245 is silent on the matter; it leaves it to the discretion of parliament. With this difference in mind, we may turn to three competing strategies for judicial review.
The first strategy might be to equate judicial review of Acts (i.e. ordinary legislative power) with those of ordinances (i.e. circumstantially conditional legislative power) while maintaining that both are reviewable on identical grounds. We know Acts in India cannot be reviewed based on, say, motive. Therefore, ordinances too cannot be reviewed based on motive. Or, we know Parliament's decision to enact a piece of legislation cannot be reviewed.
Therefore, a President's decision to promulgate an ordinance cannot likewise be reviewed.
The strategy requires an emphasis on the legislative nature of both powers. That they are prefaced by different conditions is relatively immaterial. We may refer to this as the negative approach to judicial review of presidential satisfaction.
The second strategy might be to disassociate the review of Acts from ordinances, by emphasizing the circumstantial conditions that distinguish the former. Here differences are highlighted rather than underplayed. And it may be put in the following form. While both ordinances and Acts are products of legislative power, they are prefaced by different conditions, thus making them distinct categories of legislative power. Therefore, ordinances may be reviewed on grounds normally inapplicable to legislation. That both share the narration of legislative power is relatively immaterial here. We may refer to this as an intermediate approach to judicial review.
The third strategy might be to equate Acts with ordinances, while arguing that both should be reviewed on expanded grounds. The argument is a two-step process and may be put in the following form. Thus far, courts have erred in refusing to review the constitutionality of Acts based on, say, legislative motive. If unjustifiably vitiated by animus towards a person or group, a law should be invalidated on that ground. And for that reason, an ordinance too should be invalidated if presidential satisfaction in promulgating it is vitiated by mala fide.
The third strategy then is a hybrid: it equates ordinances with Acts (as in the first instance) but argues in favour of judicial review (as in the second instance). The point here is to narrow the distinction between executive power and legislative power, and to make the latter reviewable on grounds ordinarily reserved for the former. We may refer to this as the positive approach to judicial review of presidential satisfaction.
Of the three, the first strategy is evidently the most conservative. It leaves currently applicable principles of judicial review untouched while incorporating ordinances into its fold. Conversely, the third strategy is the most radical: it seeks to widen the scope of judicial review by adding new grounds. To adopt this strategy is to buy into the US position on legislative motive, particularly as understood in the fourth phase. The second strategy, on this consideration, is a median position: applicable principles are left untouched while expelling ordinances from its purview. But it has the effect of impliedly relying on a category of legislative power -call it an "intermediate legislative power Brest's analysis is analytically challenging.
Now that we have three alternatives through which to address judicial review in
Article 123, which one should we adopt? In the next section, I will argue that this question cannot be addressed by simply referring to the relevant text for it is "agnostic" on the point.
That choice must necessarily depend on something outside of the text -something external to it.
President's Legislative Power in Perspective
In 1975, Article 123 was amended to including the following: "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the satisfaction of the President mentioned in Clause (1) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any Court on any ground." 83 Three years later, the amendment was deleted. The provision, both in its original and current form, says nothing about judicial review. In this respect, Article 123 is semantically agnostic. Therefore, the validity of the competing strategies cannot be decided simply by referring to the text.
For this reason, arguments proclaiming to derive positions on judicial review from the provision itself, as Seervai and Jain purport to do, are not worth taking seriously. They reflect little more than the authors' personal preferences. Seervai, for example, argues that "discretionary power conferred on the executive either by the Constitution or by a law, and dependent on the existence of a condition precedent is subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts ..." 84 By implication, president's satisfaction in Article 123, he concludes is reviewable. But excesses in future. 92 The possibility of review, he argues, will act as an effective check against executive excesses.
As these arguments readily suggest, a sympathetic reading of judicial review is largely grounded in the belief that the power to promulgate ordinances has been misused, or in the fear that it will be. For Seervai and Jain, misuse, as fact or likelihood, serves as a metaanvil through which to make sense of the competing strategies. To them, the "correct" strategy is one that does not preclude a judicial assessment of legislative necessity. And 
Conclusion
Ordinances are an anomalous feature of India's parliamentary system. The president, acting through the Union Cabinet, has original legislative power to enact legislation with the same force and effect as Acts. And their frequent use (and potential misuse) makes the question of judicial review particularly compelling. The case for judicial review of presidential satisfaction cannot rest on Article 123 for it is agnostic in this regard. Nor will a straightforward application of current principles applicable in associated areas of presidential satisfaction achieve that objective. Rather, the best case for judicial review depends on recognizing a category of intermediate legislative power -one that neither fully executive nor legislative, but with important characteristics of both. Fostered out of a desire to constrain potential misuse, the category provides a comfortable mean; it excludes the possibility of absolute immunity without radically reorganizing applicable principles of judicial review.
And the success of constraining president's promulgative boundaries in India may crucially hinge on how well we understand this concept of intermediate power, and its mechanics in practice.
